The Greek medical profession played an important role at the start of the Greek NHS (National Health System) in 1983 and became intrinsic to its later development. In particular, junior hospital doctors firmly established their position and rights as a result of the new NHS. Using archival sources and interviews with elite participants, this article investigates the specific patterns of power and influence that Greek NHS doctors have exerted from the establishment of the Greek NHS through the latest major attempt at reform in 2001 to the present. Hospital doctors, in particular, have been able consistently to resist any health care system reforms that might affect their dominant position. Their unchallenged position in the system derives from both the particularities of the Greek state and society (in particular, the former"s founding institutional arrangements and the latter"s clientelistic social relations), and the key role that junior doctors played in the early stages of the Greek NHS. As a result, the system is highly "path dependent" in that the initial implementation of the NHS during the 1980s ensured that subsequent reforms consistently favoured medical self-interest. While challenges to the unaccountable power of the medical profession have emerged in Greece following the financial soon to tell whether these will succeed in bringing about significant change.
Introduction
Greece has embarked upon three major health care system reforms since the restoration of democracy in 1974: in [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] 1 , 1992-1994 2 and 2001 3 . In all three cases, there has been a large gap between the goals of the reforms and their implementation in practice.
In 1983, key provisions of the socialist PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) government"s reforms under Health Minister Paraskevas Avgerinos (i.e. setting up a system of primary health care, establishing a unified health insurance fund, hospital doctors" full-time and exclusive practice in the public system, the requirement for university doctors to choose either private practice or National Health System (NHS) (public) practice and decentralization through regional health systems) failed to be implemented.
In 1992, the Conservatives, under Health Minister Georgios Sourlas, focused on individual responsibility for health care, a shift from public to private provision and from public to private finance of health care. Elements in the Conservatives" plan were dedicated once again to reforming labour relations with the medical profession, such as introducing non-permanent tenure and part-time posts for public hospital doctors, and requiring university doctors to choose between university employment and full-time work for the Greek NHS. In addition, the Government attempted to tackle the issue of informal payments from patients to doctors, especially within the public hospital sector. The majority of the reforms, especially those affecting doctors" labour relations, were never realized in the face of strong public disapproval of the changes and doctors" unwillingness to comply with their new working conditions. without the unification of the health insurance funds, the establishment of a primary health care system and the removal of traditional clientelistic party politics, this decentralization of the Greek NHS could not be implemented. As far as doctors" labour relations were concerned, Minister Papadopoulos attempted to tackle once and for all the lack of medical accountability and related medical dominance, but became embroiled in a fierce clash with the hospital doctors, especially the university doctors over reducing or abolishing private practice, which ended with his forced resignation and replacement by a more amenable minister who reversed most of the reforms in medical labour relations.
The failure of all three sets of reforms indicates that the Greek medical profession was able to resist state influence over matters such as the number and distribution of medical staff in the NHS across the country, and methods of reimbursement and accountability, and highlights their power. Hence, today there are relatively large numbers of physicians per capita in Greece, maldistributed geographically (see Tables 1 and 2 ) 4 . Physicians continue to receive informal payments and are not subject to any kind of effective external control over the services they deliver. The combination of salary in a budget-limited public system with extensive private feefor-service opportunities and lack of oversight over their working hours within the NHS, encourages doctors to minimize their effort in the public sector and maximize their time in the private sector contrary to the goals of the public system. The continuing large numbers of doctors, on the one hand, and increasingly restricted NHS resources, on the other, also explain why it has been so difficult to find a method and level of public reimbursement to meet doctors"
expectations. This, in turn, has perpetuated and encouraged the receipt of informal payments.
Informal payments reflect the inability of the Greek state to establish comprehensive coverage of the population, the fragmented way health insurance coverage has developed (favouring privileged groups, such as the liberal professions and civil servants, which, in turn, reflects the unequal distribution of power within Greek society), the desire of doctors for supplementary income, and patients" willingness to give doctors informal payments in the expectation that this will ensure that doctors provide them with good treatment. This harms poorer public patients" access to public services, in particular, since they have to pay out-of-pocket for care that should be free out of their limited incomes. The public is generally dissatisfied with the health care system 4 , dissatisfaction which may explain successive governments" efforts to reform the system and their ensuing clashes with various segments of the medical profession 5 .
Though there is already some literature on the Greek medical profession and successive Greek NHS reforms [6] [7] [8] , it dwells on the detail of reform legislation and is reliant on secondary sources.
In particular, little attention has been given to explaining precisely how the medical profession has been able to block or limit each set of reforms when these threatened to weaken its dominance and privileges.
By contrast, the current analysis uses extensive primary data, informed by insights from structural interest theory (in which the health care arena and its dynamics are defined by conflicts between the three fundamental-structural interests of the medical profession, managers and the community as -patients) 9 , the sociology of the professions (according to which once the medical profession has established its professional autonomy, it is then uniquely well positioned as a political lobby group to protect its position from challenge) 10 and historical institutionalism (which explains how, in conflicts between rival groups for scarce resources, institutions (formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 6 structure of the polity and the political economy) are likely systematically to favor some interests and disadvantage others) 11 critically to explain the largely unchallenged position of hospital doctors, in particular, in the NHS. an hour, and one and half hours. Interviews took place in informants" offices, homes, or wherever they felt comfortable to speak.
Methods
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All the interviewees gave informed, written consent to participate in the research. Some interviewees were willing to be identified though all were offered anonymity. Interviewees are described only in terms of their broad organisational affiliation to help reader comprehension. .
Whenever it was requested, a copy of the transcribed interview was provided allowing the interviewee to correct any potential misunderstanding of what they had intended to say 13 .
Interviews were analysed thematically and quotations are used to encapsulate important themes. Behind the profession"s support for further improvement of the health care system in the public interest, there lay an agenda focused on advancing the profession"s own interests in terms of wages, working conditions and training 15 .
During the parliamentary debate on the Greek NHS Bill in 1983, the political opposition was strengthened by the position adopted by the medical associations, which had argued that the transformation of doctors into employees with permanent tenure would create a medical proletariat 16 . Unions of specialists and senior doctors affiliated to the Conservative Party-New NHS". 21 The doctors were able to use the argument that without their support, it would be impossible for the new Greek NHS to function, in order to pursue their own interests. In addition, EINAP expressed its desire for a NHS that was "friendly to the patients, but also to the doctors" 22 and, as one of its senior officials at that time stated in his interview, hospital doctors wanted to reassure the public that "whenever they hear that doctors are on strike, they are fighting against something wrong that harms Greek society in general and not only doctors" .
The public was largely convinced by these arguments and supported the doctors" resistance to the government"s plans.
Under this kind of sustained pressure, the next Health Minister, Georgios Gennimatas, surrendered to the claims of the hospital doctors. The government feared that doctors, particularly the senior doctors, would not join the NHS and that PASOK would thus not be able to fulfil one of its most prominent plans for the transformation of Greek society. to practise in the big cities (see Table 2 ). In addition, public hospital doctors who had failed their NHS assessment of competence were eventually allowed to remain in post within the new system despite government plans to the contrary.
The Ministry of Health then resorted to a different approach to tackling the problem of the maldistribution of doctors by employing additional private specialists in the regions, but without any prior appraisal of their qualifications. Law 1579/1985 also increased doctors" reimbursement for "active service" (referred to as "nominal overtime pay" in the Greek NHS) [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . The government"s actions in this period had an immediate and long-term effect on hospital doctor numbers and their vested interests. First, the number of doctors that entered the Greek NHS doubled (from the 3200 that Avgerinos had initially proposed to over 7000 by 1986), and second, this increase enabled the medical profession to form a solid and powerful interest group within the Greek NHS whose support no political party could afford to lose. Committee"s report, informal payments were "insignificant and within the limits of personal relations" 32 , and thus not something that should be the subject of further legal regulation.
However, an earlier draft of the Committee"s report had appeared in the daily newspaper, "TO VIMA". It had clearly stated that most hospital doctors encouraged informal payments. Two weeks later this was changed to state that only a few hospital doctors received informal payments, and that the payments were not initiated by the doctors -rather patients spontaneously offered them, or, as a senior journalist expressed it in his interview, "patients tempted doctors with them" . 34 This was a view widely held outside the medical profession. For example, a high ranking bureaucrat of the period argued at interview that the persistence of fakelaki (informal
payment) was: "… a crime committed by two sides. There is an individual that gives the money and there is another individual that receives the money. As a result, we cannot put the blame on doctors who receive informal payments....".
The Parliamentary Committee"s final report was further strongly influenced by the fact that all the members of the inter-party Committee were physicians unanimously supportive of the hospital doctors 35 . Unanimity among Greek parliamentarians is rare, so it seems that the Greek doctors" lobby had again managed to transcend party politics 35 .
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The Committee"s conclusion that patients were to blame for informal payments protected hospital doctors from future accusations of impropriety. The inability of the state to properly implement and monitor regulations regarding doctors" working practices, the exploitation of these dysfunctional institutional arrangements by NHS doctors and the strong representation of doctors in, and their intimate connections to, the Greek Parliament, together explain how the Committee"s report was able to be manipulated in favour of the status quo. It was no coincidence that in 1992, 48 of the 300 MPs were from the medical profession and that they were so well represented on the Committee investigating informal payments. As the daily newspaper, TO VIMA, argued, the MPs on the Committee acted first as doctors and only second as representatives of the Greek people 34, 36 .
As well as successfully resisting any external regulation of informal payments during the early 1990s, hospital doctors were also able to resist any kind of external appraisal of the quality of their clinical work. The roots of their ability to avoid external appraisal lay in Health Minister
Gennimatas" plan in the 1980s to build a solid bloc of vested medical interests in support of the institution of the Greek NHS, designed to remove any threat that successor governments might try to abolish the new system. As a result, the state was able to build a strong Greek NHS, at least at the start, but, at the same time, an institution subordinated to the interests of the Greek medical profession. As a result, when the Conservative government tried in 1991 to introduce a system of independent audit specifically to investigate if hospital doctors were fulfilling their "overtime active duty", this was fiercely and successfully resisted. For example, at one public hospital, not a single doctor was on duty when the auditors arrived. Later, the doctors appeared and forced the auditors to leave the hospital 37 .
2001: hospital doctors' continuing demonstration of their power and influence
In 2001, the PASOK Health Minister, Alekos Papadopoulos, proposed further reforms designed to challenge vested medical interests in the Greek health care system. As a previously successful
Minister of Finance, Papadopoulos was sufficiently ambitious to believe that he could tackle the long standing problems of the Greek health care system. He also believed that it would be possible to transcend old style party politics in pursuit of his reforms. His proposals included the development of 17 decentralized Regional Health Systems, new managerial structures within the public hospitals, modification of the terms of employment of the Greek NHS and university doctors, and 24-hour opening of the public hospitals, with afternoon outpatient clinics, where doctors could treat their private patients on site on a fee-for-service basis so that more of the doctors" private practice would take place where it could be observed and any shirking of public responsibilities would be more visible. In addition, a percentage of the doctors" fees would be shared with the public hospital. Finally, hospitals were to become accountable to the appropriate Regional Health System rather than remaining part of central government and the civil service.
Presenting itself as the guardian of the public interest, EINAP opposed the 2001 plan on the grounds that "it promotes the private health sector and damages the social and public character of the system", arguing somewhat tendentiously that the introduction of managers in public hospitals, the introduction of a unified insurance health fund, which was intended to be a private not for profit entity and not a public one (ODIPY), and the afternoon private outpatient clinics in the public hospitals, where patients had to pay for the doctor"s time, amounted to wholesale privatization. Its President, Dr. Stathis Tsoukalos, argued that the plan gave the misleading impression that up to now there had been total chaos in the Greek health care system, when, in fact, Greece had scored relatively well in a recent WHO global ranking of health care systems (achieving 14 th place in 2000) 38 . In addition, as another member of EINAP"s executive committee argued at interview, hospital doctors had warned the Minister that, although reforming legislation had been passed previously, much of it had remained a "dead letter", As far as informal payments were concerned, the representatives of the medical profession continued to downplay their extent, and where they existed, argued that they were due to poor pay and were initiated consistently by patients. As a result, according to Liaropoulos et al. 43 , the majority of public hospital doctors still receive informal payments (only 4% of NHS hospital doctors denied receiving informal payments in 2008), despite the fact that Law 3745/2009 puts hospital doctors at the top of the civil servants" pay scale [44] [45] . A rough calculation of the additional informal income of each Greek NHS doctor is around 7,300 Euros per year or a third of the official average salary of a public hospital doctor (assuming that there were 27,386 NHS hospital doctors) 46 . There are NHS doctors who do not receive or accept any informal payments and, at the other extreme, cases of NHS doctors whose illegal income far exceeds their official salary 48 .
Discussion
Until 25 years ago, there had been very little research interest in Greece in public policy, including in the health field. During the 1990s, researchers started to look at health policy and reforms [47] [48] [49] . Scholars such as Venieris 6 and Mossialos 50-51 evaluated how the reforms of the Greek NHS (1983-2001) had affected funding and service provision. In addition, Carlos 52 and Guillen 53 adopted a Southern European comparative welfare state perspective to explain why countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece had decided to implement NHSs during the 1980s. They argued that the role of the medical profession was crucial in the implementation of these reforms, but they did not seek to explain in detail using primary data how the profession was able to exert so much influence to frustrate reformers from both left and right wing political institutions (e.g. local community medical services, food banks, Third Sector legal assistance, independent local food markets, etc.), the population has begun to organize and act beyond the reach of the hegemonic vested interests of Greek society. These initiatives are based on the principles of participatory democracy and local empowerment. In the health care arena, they can be found in the activities of independent groups exposing hospital doctors who accept informal payments. However, the courts are also beginning to act against tax evasion by doctors, including their receipt of informal payments, and to patients against medical malpractice.
Whether these early signs of patient and public empowerment, and maturity in relations with the medical profession become the foundation for challenging the medical profession"s hegemony remains to be seen. However, challenging doctors" status and immunity from accountability are important steps towards re-evaluating how the principles, aims and objectives of the Greek NHS are to be realized in practice. They could lead gradually to the NHS" transformation.
However, in order to make genuine progress with key reforms, such as a better organized primary care system able to relieve some of the demand for hospital care and contribute to the Troika"s demands for curbs on public spending, a high level of political consensus is required, or at least the ability to compromise among the groups whose support is necessary to implement changes, many of whom potentially stand to lose, at least in the short term. In addition, a strong state, with a politically neutral bureaucratic elite is needed to sustain reform implementation.
Unfortunately, no sustained consensus was achieved in 1983, and there has been no sustained public pressure in favour of significant health sector reform where this affects the prerogatives of the medical profession.
Conclusion
Hospital doctors, in particular, have been able consistently to resist any health care system reforms that might affect the dominant position of the medical profession in the Greek NHS.
Their unchallenged position in the system derives from both the particularities of the Greek state and society (in particular, the former"s founding institutional arrangements and the latter"s clientelistic social relations), and the key role that junior doctors played in the early stages of the Greek NHS after 1983. As a result, the system is highly "path dependent" in that the initial implementation of the Greek NHS during the 1980s ensured that subsequent reforms consistently favoured medical self-interest. While challenges to the unaccountable power of the medical profession have emerged in Greece following the financial crisis of 2009, including the beginnings of a popular critique of the medical profession, it is too soon to tell whether these will succeed in bringing about significant change. Source: (OECD, 2015) 
